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This contention, however, has been disputed and is the subject of more
4
opinion than fact. 2
The increased liability imposed on insurance companies has resulted in
detailed legal instructions from insurance attorneys and other writers advising
insurers how to avoid excess judgment suits. Insurers are typically advised
to investigate all phases of each case diligently; to keep the insured informed
of all developments in negotiating settlements; to avoid arbitrary rejection
of settlement offers; 43 and, if possible, to accept a settlement if a verdict
has been returned for more than the policy limits.These instructions indicate that decisions such as the instant case are
increasing the protection given the insured by his insurer. The present case
indicates that Florida courts seem bent on continuing the trend toward
greater responsibility of insurance companies by abandoning the bad faith
standard and moving toward strict liability.
JAMES G. PRESSLY, JR.

STANDING FOR REVIEW OF ACTIONS BY FEDERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: A NEW TEST
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,1
397 U.S. 150 (1970)
Petitioners, sellers of data processing services and equipment to businesses,
sought judicial review of a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that
permitted national banks to offer data processing services to their customers
and other banks.2 Petitioners alleged that this ruling violated section 4 of the
Bank Service Corporations Act of 19623 and that the resulting competition
was therefore illegal. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground
42. Compare Note, supra note 40, at 485, with Snow, Excess Liability-Crisciand Lysick,
36 INS. COUNSEL J. 51, 55 (1969).
43. Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal To Defend or Settle, 28 INs. COUNSEL J.
58, 67-69 (1961).
44. Austin & Locke, Handling the Excess Coverage Situation for the Insurer, 36 INS.
COUNSEL J. 60, 67-69 (1969). Although settlement after verdict is relatively unlikely, the
plaintiff may need the recovery immediately and may accept an amount less than judgment
if the defendant plans to appeal.
1. This case was decided with Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), rev'g 398 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1968). That case involved the standing of cash rent tenant farmers to challenge a federal regulation permitting petitioners' landlord to demand assignment of government subsidy payments as a condition to granting petitioners a lease to work the land.
Applying the holding of the principal case the Court reversed the appellate court and
held that petitioners had standing.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, COMnTRoLLER's MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS ff3500
(1961).
3. 76 Stat. 1132 (1962), 12 U.S.C. §1864 (1964).
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that petitioners lacked standing,4 and the United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, affirmed. 5 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and HELD, petitioners had standing to seek judicial review because
they alleged that the ruling had in fact injured them and because the
interest they sought to protect was within the "zone of interests" contemplated by the relevant statute.6 Justices Brennan and White dissented in
7
part.
The instant case is the culmination of a federal, judicial trend that has
gradually expanded the class of persons who may seek judicial review of
administrative actions." This line of decisions consists of varying departures
from the "legal interest" test, which was first applied to administrative law
litigation in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA. 9 As originally defined,
this test required a plaintiff who sought standing to protest an injury caused
by a government agent to show that the injury actually invaded a "legal
right, - one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."'
Generally, the legal interests test was applied narrowly in circumstances
where private business interests challenged governmental or governmentabetted competitors.", Competition alone does not ordinarily result in the
violation of a legal right. Thus, courts have usually held that a plaintiff
did not have standing to complain of a governmental rival's lack of constitutional or statutory authority to compete, unless the competition was illegal
2
per se because it involved fraud, malice, or conspiracy.'
Important judicial exceptions to this narrow rule developed, which required allegations of "inherently illegal" competition and usually were
framed within the context of traditional legal interest criteria. Since
Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. United States,'3 federal courts have been willing
to grant standing in cases where Congress has manifested a statutory intent
to protect a particular class of persons.' 4 However, in granting standing, the
courts in effect created legal rights sufficient to satisfy the legal interest test.
This often was accomplished by a tortuous construction of the statute
involved. The crucial factor in many cases was the predilection of the

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Radio

279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970).
Id. at 167 (dissenting opinion).
See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354

F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
9. 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
10. Id.; accord, Walla NValla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
11. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969).
12. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).

13. 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
14. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940).
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particular court toward either broad or strict statutory construction; this
engendered an amorphous, elusive, and inconsistent body of legal precedent.15
A line of cases related to the legal interest doctrine and within the
ambit of so-called "standing by congressional intent" has constituted another
exception to the traditional rule requiring allegations of illegality per se in
challenges to government-supported competition. These cases involve federal
regulatory statutes that expressly grant judicial review to persons aggrieved
or adversely affected by agency action. 1 The leading case in this area is
FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station," in which an existing FCC licensee
sought standing under the Communications Act 8 to challenge the awarding
of a license to a potential competitor. The Act provided review for a "person
S.. aggrieved... whose interests are adversely affected" by an FCC ruling. 9
In setting a precedent for subsequent cases involving similar statutory provisions,20 the Court subordinated the specific review provisions and inquired
into the congressional intent behind the entire Act: "Plainly it is not the
purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against competition but to protect
the public."2' The licensee was held to have standing, not to assert his
private interests, but to assert those of the public at large. 22 The Court noted:
"It is within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an
appeal." 23 Thus, in pronouncing what, until the instant case, remained
the most liberal criteria 24 for standing to obtain review of administrative

15. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), citing Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 465,
498 (1966); see K. DAVIS, ADMINISrEATIvE LAw TEcr §22.01 (2d ed. 1959); L. JArrrE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AnmIsmATVE AMrON 502 (1965); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968).
16. See, e.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77i (a) (1964) ("any person aggrieved
by an order of the Commission.
...); The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§402(b) (6) (1964) ("person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by
any order of the Commission ... .); The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §1486(a)
(1964) ("any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order.
); The Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §1(20) (1964) ("[a]ny party in interest .
.);
The Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §8251(b) (1964) ("any party to a proceeding . . . aggrieved by an
order .... ").
17. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
18. The Communications Act of 1954, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§§151 et seq. (1964).
19. 47 U.S.C. §402 (b) (6) (1964).
20. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 590 U.S. 1 (1968); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
21. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 509 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
22. Id. at 477.
23. Id.
24. Professor Davis of the University of Chicago has suggested that the review provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (Supp. III, 1965-1967), amending 5
U.S.C. §1009(a) (1964), were enacted to allow standing to anyone aggrieved or injured
in fact, notwithstanding a failure by the party to show violation of a common law or
statutory right. K. DAvis, ADmINIsTRATIVE LAW TEXT §22.02 (1959); Davis, Standing: Tax.
payers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601, 617-36 (1968). However, this contention has been
rejected by a majority of the courts. See, e.g., Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v.
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action, 25 the Court nevertheless dung to the legal interest test.28
Petitioners in the instant case had alleged they were within a class that
27
Congress had sought to protect by enacting the relevant regulatory statute.
The district court rejected this argument and applied the legal interest test
to deny standing. 28 However, the Supreme Court categorically rejected the
legal interest criteria and stated "[that] test goes to the merits." 29 The Court
here referred to the common practice among courts applying the legal
interest test of reaching the merits in the process of deciding the issue of
standing.Theoretically, standing does not involve the merits of a case but only
whether a party has a sufficient stake in the outcome to insure concrete
adverseness in the course of subsequent adjudication on the merits. 31 In
practice, however, courts applying the legal interest criteria have been
reluctant to rely on the pleadings and have reached the merits to ascertain
whether plaintiffs suffered a legal injury.2 2 By eliminating the legal interest
test in the present case, the Court found the only requisite for standing to
be, apart from a personal stake in the outcome, "whether the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interest
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."3
When examined against this background, the principal case appears
to alter significantly, not only in theory but in practice, existing federal law
on standing to challenge administrative action. It is the first clearly absolute
departure from the legal interest test, and it is the first case in the history
of federal administrative law to clearly distinguish standing from the merits.
The decision will almost certainly be criticized for opening the judicial
doors to floods of litigants. This objection has arisen before in the federal

Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962); Kansas City Power & Light Co.
v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
25. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
26. A similar rationale was used in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
27. Bank Service Corporations Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. §1864 (1964).
28. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), afj'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
29. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
30. See, e.g., Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
31. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (alleging conspiracy);
REA v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966) (alleging conspiracy and antitrust violations); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (alleging conspiracy). In all instances the courts confused the
issue of standing with the merits.
33. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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courts34 and has been consistently dismissed as having no justification.3 5 The
cost of seeking judicial review probably provides a sufficient deterrent to
those not sincerely interested in asserting legitimate claims. 3 6 Moreover, the
availability of class action and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should serve to mitigate any increased burden placed on the courts
by liberalized standing criteria. Neither the majority nor the dissent raised
these questions of policy. In fact, the dissent would have further broadened
the holding to allow standing to anyone able to show a direct injury by
agency action.37
The potential impact of the instant decision on the whole spectrum of
administrative law may readily be seen in the surprising frequency with
which it has already been utilized by lower courts.38 The liberalization of
standing requirements may represent a continuing judicial interest in broadening the base of protections available to citizens against arbitrary governmental action. 39 In an era of ever-increasing government administrative
activity, this interest is a salutary one.
ARTHUR CLIFTON BLACK

34. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 884 U.S. 941 (1966); Associated Indus.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 707 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
35. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
36. Experience in the Second Judicial Circuit confirms this view. Id. at 617.
37. 397 U.S. 150, 168 (1970). "Aggrievement in fact" is a real injury, but one that has
not resulted in an invasion of a common law or statutory right. K. DAvIs, ADATmNInsTsrvE
LAW TExT, §22.02 (1959); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. RPv. 601,
617-36 (1968).
38. See, e.g., Izaac Walton League v. Harden, No. 5-69 Civ. 70 (D. Minn., June 1, 1970);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Harden, No. 23,813 (D.D.C., May 28, 1970); Pennsylvania
Environmental v. Bartlett, No. 70-123 (M.D. Pa., April 30, 1970); Crother v. Seaborg, Nos.
C-1702, C-1712, C-1722 (D. Colo., March 16, 1970).
39. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
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